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Abstract : A statistical test can be seen as a procedure to produce a decision based on observed data, where
some decisions consist of rejecting a hypothesis (yielding a significant result) and some do not, and where
one controls the probability to make a wrong rejection at some pre-specified significance level. Whereas
traditional hypothesis testing involves only two possible decisions (to reject or not a null hypothesis),
Kaiser’s directional two-sided test as well as the more recently introduced Jones and Tukey’s testing
procedure involve three possible decisions to infer on unidimensional parameter. The latter procedure
assumes that a point null hypothesis is impossible (e.g. that two treatments cannot have exactly the
same effect), allowing a gain of statistical power. There are however situations where a point hypothesis
is indeed plausible, for example when considering hypotheses derived from Einstein’s theories. In this
article, we introduce a five-decision rule testing procedure, which combines the advantages of the testing
procedures of Kaiser (no assumption on a point hypothesis being impossible) and of Jones and Tukey
(higher power), allowing for a non-negligible (typically 20%) reduction of the sample size needed to reach
a given statistical power to get a significant result, compared to the traditional approach.
Keywords: Composite hypothesis; Directional two-sided test; Null hypothesis; Probability of a wrong
rejection; Sample size calculation; Statistical power; Three-decision testing procedure.
∗AMD and ZK were supported by SystemsX.ch (51RTP0 151019) and by the Swiss National Science Foundation
(31003A-143914).
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
06
67
6v
1 
 [m
ath
.ST
]  
18
 O
ct 
20
17
1 Introduction
A statistical test can be seen as a procedure to produce a decision based on observed data (Kaiser, 1960).
For example, traditional one-sided and two-sided tests to make inference on a unidimensional parameter
are testing procedures with two possible decisions (to reject or not a null hypothesis). On the other hand,
Kaiser (1960) and Jones and Tukey (2000) introduced testing procedures with three possible decisions.
In this article, we propose a testing procedure with five possible decisions. In all these testing procedures,
some decisions consist of rejecting a hypothesis, yielding a “significant result”, and some do not. In what
follows, a testing procedure is said to be valid if it allows to control the probability to make a wrong
rejection, i.e. to reject a hypothesis which is true, the “significance level” α of a testing procedure being
defined as the maximal probability to make a wrong rejection, typically set at 5%.
In what follows, we shall consider some unidimensional parameter θ and some reference value of
interest θ0. In a one-sided test to the left, one attempts to reject θ ≥ θ0. In a one-sided test to the
right, one attempts to reject θ ≤ θ0. In a traditional two-sided test, one attempts to reject θ = θ0,
with no information whether θ ≥ θ0 or θ ≤ θ0 is rejected in case of a significant result. As noted by
Kaiser (1960), “it seems difficult to imagine a problem for which this traditional test could give results of
interest” and “to find a ‘significant’ effect and not be able to decide in which direction this difference or
effect lies, seems a sterile way to do business”. This is why he proposed instead a “directional two-sided
test” which is equivalent to perform two one-sided tests, one to the left and one to the right, where one
has the possibility to reject either θ ≥ θ0 or θ ≤ θ0, depending on which one-sided test is significant. To
maintain the probability of a wrong rejection at pre-specified significance level α in case θ = θ0 is true,
the two one-sided tests are run at the nominal significance level α/2.
Most practitioners are actually applying (sometimes implicitly) a directional two-sided test when
inferring on a unidimensional parameter. Some authors have objected, however, that a point hypothesis
θ = θ0 (contrary to a composite hypothesis) is almost certainly false. For example, a null hypothesis
stating that the effects of two treatments A and B are equal is (in a strict sense) false since one of the
two treatments A or B is inevitably superior to the other, even if not in a clinical relevant way. Jones
and Tukey (2000) referred therefore to “the fiction of the null hypothesis” and concluded that “point
hypotheses, while mathematically convenient, are never fulfilled in practice”. Other quotations from the
literature include e.g. “the null hypothesis is quasi-always false” (Meehl, 1978), “all we know about the
world teaches us that the effects of A and B are always different - in some decimal places - for any A
and B” (Tukey, 1991), or “in most comparative clinical trials, the point null hypothesis of no difference
is not really believable” (Freedman, 2008). Considering the point hypothesis θ = θ0 to be impossible
implies that the two one-sided tests performed in a directional two-sided test can actually be run at the
nominal significance level α (instead of α/2), yielding the three-decision testing procedure of Jones and
Tukey (2000).
Of course, not having to divide the nominal significance level by two when running the two one-sided
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tests implies a higher probability of getting a significant result, such that Jones and Tukey’s testing
procedure is more powerful than Kaiser’s one. The price to pay for this gain of power is to assume that
the point hypothesis θ = θ0 is impossible, which might be regarded as an infinitely mild assumption.
There are however situations where a point hypothesis is indeed plausible, for example in mathematics,
if one considers e.g. the hypothesis that there are exactly 50% of odd digits among the decimals of pi, or
in particle physics, when considering the well-accepted hypothesis that an anti-electron and an electron
have the same mass, or hypotheses derived from Einstein’s theories, among others. In the present
paper, we propose a five-decision testing procedure which combines the advantages of the procedures of
Kaiser (no assumption on the point hypothesis being impossible) and of Jones and Tukey (higher power).
Our five-decision rule simplifies to that of Jones and Tukey if one assumes that a point hypothesis
is impossible, and even without this assumption, yields an increase of the statistical power to get a
significant result compared to Kaiser’s approach. Our five-decision testing procedure is described and its
validity is established in Section 2. An illustration is provided in Section 3. Statistical power and sample
size calculation are examined in Section 4. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 A five-decision testing procedure
As done in Section 1, we consider some unidimensional parameter θ, e.g. a mean difference or a correlation,
and some reference value of interest θ0 for this parameter, e.g. the value 0. We consider the hypotheses,
H1 : θ ≥ θ0, H2 : θ > θ0, H3 : θ = θ0, H4 : θ < θ0 and H5 : θ ≤ θ0. While H1, H2, H4 and H5 are
composite hypotheses that we shall try to reject using our testing procedure, H3 is a point hypothesis
which we refer to as “the null hypothesis”, although it will be only a “working hypothesis” in what
follows. We then consider a test statistic Tstat, a random variable with c.d.f. Fθ(t) = Prθ{Tstat ≤ t}
which depends on the true value of θ, and we denote by tstat its realization calculated from a sample of
data. We make the following assumptions:
(A1) the distribution of Tstat under the null hypothesis (in what follows, the null distribution), and
hence Fθ0(t) is known, and let qα = F
−1
θ0
(α) (where 0 < α < 1)
(A2) Fθ(t) is monotone in θ, such that θ1 < θ2 implies Fθ1(t) ≥ Fθ2(t) (for all t)
(A3) to avoid unnecessary complications in our exposition below, we consider that the null distribution
is truly continuous, such that Prθ0{Tstat < t} = Prθ0{Tstat ≤ t} (whatever t) and such that
Fθ0(qα) = α (for all α).
Note that Assumption (A1) is needed in any statistical test involving a point null hypothesis, assumption
(A2) is classical (ensuring e.g. unbiased tests and monotonicity of statistical power), whereas assumption
(A3) could be relaxed (although this would require more complicated notations). Given a pre-specified
significance level α, our five-decision testing procedure is then defined as follows:
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decision event hypothesis rejected
1 tstat < qα/2 H1 : θ ≥ θ0
2 qα/2 ≤ tstat < qα H2 : θ > θ0
3 qα ≤ tstat ≤ q1−α none
4 q1−α < tstat ≤ q1−α/2 H4 : θ < θ0
5 q1−α/2 < tstat H5 : θ ≤ θ0
To ensure mutually exclusive decisions, we consider 0 < α ≤ 0.5. Note that the first, second, fourth
and fifth decisions result in the rejection of a hypothesis whereas the third decision does not. Note also
that some rejections are stronger than other, rejection of H1 implying rejection of H2 and rejection of
H5 implying rejection of H4. As in Kaiser (1960) and Jones and Tukey (2000), when a hypothesis is
rejected we consider the complementary hypothesis to be implicitly accepted (which is particularly simple
to define since the rejected hypothesis involves only a unidimensional parameter). Thus, rejection of H1,
H2, H4 or H5 implicitly implies acceptance of H4, H5, H1 and H2 respectively.
Of note, our five-decision testing procedure could be formulated as a combination of three traditional
tests: two one sided-tests, one to the left (OSL) where one tries to reject H1 : θ ≥ θ0, one to the right
(OSR) where one tries to reject H5 : θ ≤ θ0, and one traditional two-sided test (TS), where one tries to
reject the null hypothesis H3 : θ = θ0, each of them run at the same significance level 0 < α ≤ 0.5, with
five possibilities corresponding to our five decisions as follows:
decision outcome of traditional tests hypothesis rejected in the
five-decision testing procedure
1 reject both H1 (with OSL) and H3 (with TS) H1 : θ ≥ θ0
2 reject H1 (with OSL), not H3 (with TS) H2 : θ > θ0
3 reject neither H1, H5 nor H3 (with OSL, OSR and TS) none
4 reject H5 (with OSR), not H3 (with TS) H4 : θ < θ0
5 reject both H5 (with OSR) and H3 (with TS) H5 : θ ≤ θ0
Although in general a testing procedure obtained as a combination of tests that control the type I
error at some level α is not guaranteed to control type I error at α, we demonstrate below that our
five-decision testing procedure is valid. Recall that a testing procedure is valid if the probability to make
a wrong rejection cannot exceed α, whatever the true value of θ. Note first that if θ = θ0, one gets a
wrong rejection when the first or fifth decision occurs, i.e. either when tstat < qα/2 or when tstat > q1−α/2.
This kind of wrong rejection is known as a type I error. The probability that this happens is given by:
Prθ0{tstat < qα/2}+ Prθ0{tstat > q1−α/2} = Fθ0(qα/2) + 1− Fθ0(q1−α/2) = α/2 + 1− (1− α/2) = α.
If θ < θ0, one gets a wrong rejection when the fourth or fifth decision occurs, i.e. when tstat > q1−α.
In case of decision 5, such a wrong rejection is sometimes referred to as a type III error (Kimball, 1957;
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Leventhal and Huynh, 1996; Shaffer, 2002) or “operational type I error” (Senn, 2007, p. 188). The
probability that this happens is given by:
Prθ{tstat > q1−α} = 1− Fθ(q1−α) ≤ 1− Fθ0(q1−α) = 1− (1− α) = α.
Thus, this probability is unknown but not larger than α. If θ > θ0, one gets a wrong rejection when the
first or second decision occurs, i.e. when tstat < qα. In case of decision 1, this is another example of type
III error. The probability that this happens is given by:
Prθ{tstat < qα} = Fθ(qα) ≤ Fθ0(qα) = α.
Thus, whatever the true value of θ, the probability to make a wrong rejection is unknown, but bounded by
α, ensuring the validity of the testing procedure, which is either correctly sized if θ = θ0, or conservative
if θ < θ0 or θ > θ0. If the null distribution is known only approximately, the testing procedure is still
approximately valid.
A typical example where Assumptions (A1)–(A3) hold and where the null distribution is known exactly
(under some conditions such as normality and homoscedasticity) are t-tests. Another example where the
null distribution is known approximately are Wald tests. In that case, the test statistic is defined as
Tstat = (θ̂ − θ0)/SE(θ̂), where θ̂ is a consistent and (asymptotically) normally distributed estimate of
θ and SE(θ̂) is (a consistent estimate of) the standard error of θ̂ (which is ideally calculated under the
null hypothesis), such that the null distribution is approximately standard normal. One has in that case
qα ≈ zα, where zα = Φ−1(α) and Φ(t) refers to the c.d.f. of a standard normal distribution. With α = 5%,
decisions 1–5 are taken when respectively tstat < −1.96, −1.96 ≤ tstat < −1.645, −1.645 ≤ tstat ≤ 1.645,
1.645 < tstat ≤ 1.96 and 1.96 < tstat.
3 Illustration
To illustrate our testing procedure, we consider the “ChickWeight” data set available in the R base
package. In that data set, 50 chicks have been followed up during the first three weeks of life. The
chicks received different experimental protein diets (20 received diet 1, 10 diet 2, 10 diet 3 and 10
diet 4) and have been weighed every two days. Figure 1 shows boxplots of the weight measured after
20 days for the 10 chicks which received diet 2, and for the 10 chicks which received diet 3. One
can see that the sample mean was higher with diet 3 than with diet 2 (258.9 vs 205.6 grams), whereas
sample standard deviations were similar (65.2 vs 70.3 grams), a pooled standard deviation being obtained
as ((65.22 + 70.32)/2)1/2 = 67.8. Let µ2 and µ3 denote the true means in these two groups and let
θ = µ3 − µ2. The test statistic of a two-sample t-test to try to reject the equality of the two means is
given by tstat = (10/2)
1/2 · (258.9−205.6)/67.8 = 1.76, yielding a (two-sided) p-value of p = 0.096. Recall
that the null distribution is here a t-distribution with 18 degrees of freedom, for which the quantile 97.5%
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Figure 1: Boxplots of the weight after 20 days for chicks nourished with diet 2 and diet 3.
is given by q0.975 = 2.10 and the quantile 95% by q0.95 = 1.73. In what follows, we discuss the results of
the different testing procedures presented above, run each at the α = 5% significance level.
• Kaiser’s testing procedure (directional two sided-test): Since |tstat| ≤ q0.975, we are not able
to reject the null hypothesis H3 : θ = 0 of no mean difference between the two groups (as already
indicated by the fact that 0.05 ≤ p).
• Jones and Tukey’s testing procedure (two one-sided tests): Since q0.95 < tstat, and assuming
that the null hypothesis H3 : θ = 0 is impossible, we are able to reject the hypothesis H5 : θ ≤ 0
(and thus to conclude that the true mean with diet 3 is strictly higher than the true mean with
diet 2). One could have reached the same conclusion without looking at the critical value q0.95 by
noting that p < 0.10 and that the sample mean is higher with diet 3 than with diet 2.
• Five-decision testing procedure: Since q0.95 < tstat ≤ q0.975, and without assuming that the
null hypothesis is impossible, we are able to reject the hypothesis H4 : θ < 0 (and thus to conclude
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that the true mean with diet 3 is at least as high than the true mean with diet 2). One could have
reached the same conclusion without looking at the critical values q0.95 and q0.975 by noting that
0.05 ≤ p < 0.10 and that the sample mean is higher with diet 3 than with diet 2. On the other
hand, if we assume that the null hypothesis is impossible, rejecting H4 is equivalent to rejecting H5
such that one gets the same conclusions as with Jones and Tukey’s testing procedure.
Figure 2 illustrates what happens when performing the five-decision testing procedure at different
significance levels, showing the decision achieved in function of the value of tstat in the context of our
example (i.e. a two-sample t-test where the null distribution is a t-distribution with 18 degrees of freedom).
With tstat = 1.76, while we just saw that one rejects H4 : θ < 0 at the 5% significance level, one can see
on that figure that one rejects H5 : θ ≤ 0 at the 10% significance level (which is a stronger rejection than
to reject H4), whereas no hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% significance level.
It is well known that one rejects the null hypothesis θ = 0 in a traditional two-sided two-sample t-test
at the 5% significance level if and only if the value 0 is lying outside a 95% confidence interval for θ. In
Kaiser’s testing procedure, one then rejects θ ≥ 0 if 0 is lying on the right of the confidence interval, and
one rejects θ ≤ 0 if 0 is lying on the left of the confidence interval. To get informed about the outcome of
the five-decision testing procedure at the 5% significance level, one needs to calculate a 90%, in addition
to a 95% confidence interval for θ, and to proceed as follows:
(decision 1) reject H1 : θ ≥ 0 if the value 0 is found on the right of the 95% confidence interval,
(decision 2) reject H2 : θ > 0 if the value 0 is found on the right of the 90%, but within the 95%
confidence interval,
(decision 3) no rejection if the value is 0 is found within the 90% confidence interval,
(decision 4) reject H4 : θ < 0 if the value 0 is found on the left of the 90%, but within the 95%
confidence interval,
(decision 5) reject H5 : θ ≤ 0 if the value 0 is found on the left of the 95% confidence interval.
In our example, a 95% confidence interval for θ is given by [−10.4; 117.0] while a 90% confidence interval
for θ is given by [0.7; 105.9]. Since the value 0 belongs to the 95% confidence interval while being on the
left of the 90% confidence interval, one (again) rejects H4 : θ < 0 at the 5% significance level.
4 Statistical power and sample size calculation
Whereas the significance level α of a testing procedure is the (maximal) probability to (wrongly) reject
a hypothesis which is true, the statistical power ψ can be defined as the probability to (correctly) reject
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test statistic
tstat=1.76
H1 H2 no rejection H4 H5
(c)    α=1%
H1 H2 no rejection H4 H5
(b)    α=5%
H1 H2 no rejection H4 H5
(a)    α=10%
Figure 2: Decision (rejection) achieved when using the five-decision testing procedure at significance level
(a) α = 10%, (b) α = 5%, and (c) α = 1%, depending on the the value of the test statistic, in the context
of our example (i.e. a two-sample t-test where the null distribution is a t-distribution with 18 degrees of
freedom). With a calculated value of tstat = 1.76 (vertical line), one rejects H5 : θ ≤ 0 at the 10% level,
one rejects H4 : θ < 0 at the 5% level, while no hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% level (where θ is the
mean difference of weights between chicks nourished with diet 3 and chicks nourished with diet 2).
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a hypothesis which is false. We provide below formulas for the statistical power achieved with our five-
decision testing procedure in the case of a Wald test. Note that formulae provided in this section are
asymptotical and may require large sample sizes to become accurate.
• in the case θ < θ0, the probability to (correctly) reject H1 : θ ≥ θ0 (decision 1) is given by:
ψ1 = Prθ{tstat < zα/2} = Φ(zα/2 + (θ0 − θ)/SE(θ̂))
• in the case θ ≤ θ0, the probability to (correctly) reject H2 : θ > θ0 (decision 1 or 2) is given by:
ψ2 = Prθ{tstat < zα} = Φ(zα + (θ0 − θ)/SE(θ̂))
• in the case θ ≥ θ0, the probability to (correctly) reject H4 : θ < θ0 (decision 4 or 5) is given by:
ψ4 = Prθ{tstat > zα} = Φ(zα + (θ − θ0)/SE(θ̂))
• in the case θ > θ0, the probability to (correctly) reject H5 : θ ≤ θ0 (decision 5) is given by:
ψ5 = Prθ{tstat > zα/2} = Φ(zα/2 + (θ − θ0)/SE(θ̂)).
As an example, let consider α = 5% and a case with θ > θ0, where the difference between θ and θ0
expressed in “standard error units” is given by (θ − θ0)/SE(θ̂) = 2.5. The probability to (correctly)
reject H5 : θ ≤ θ0 is given by ψ5 = Φ(−1.96 + 2.5) = 70.5%, whereas the probability to (correctly) reject
H4 : θ < θ0 is given by ψ4 = Φ(−1.645 + 2.5) = 80.4%. The power to reject a strict inequality (H4) is
logically higher than the power to reject a non-strict inequality (H5). Note also that if one considers the
null hypothesis to be impossible, rejecting H4 will be equivalent to rejecting H5, enabling an increase of
statistical power from 70.5% to 80.4%.
An increase of statistical power allows in turn a reduction of the sample size n needed to reach a
given statistical power when designing a study. In the case of a Wald test where the standard error of
the estimate θ̂ is given by SE(θ̂) = τ/
√
n (not depending on the true value of θ), the sample size needed
to reject a non-strict inequality (H1 : θ ≥ θ0 or H5 : θ ≤ θ0) with given probability (power) ψ is given by:
n =
(z1−α/2 + zψ)2τ2
(θ − θ0)2 (1)
whereas the sample size needed to reject a strict inequality (H2 : θ > θ0 or H4 : θ < θ0) with given
probability (power) ψ is given by:
n =
(z1−α + zψ)2τ2
(θ − θ0)2 . (2)
Compared to a traditional sample size calculation (1) for rejecting only a non-strict inequality, the sample
size calculated via (2) for rejecting a strict inequality, as enabled in our testing procedure, yields a relative
reduction of sample size of:
(z1−α/2 + zψ)2 − (z1−α + zψ)2
(z1−α/2 + zψ)2
. (3)
The following table provides such examples of sample size reduction (3) in function of ψ and α:
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ψ = 50% ψ = 80% ψ = 90% ψ = 95% ψ = 99%
α = 5% 30% 21% 18% 17% 14%
α = 1% 18% 14% 13% 11% 10%
α = 0.5% 16% 12% 11% 10% 9%
α = 0.1% 12% 9% 9% 8% 7%
Thus, having settled for rejecting a strict rather than a non-strict inequality, which will be of particular
interest for those assuming the null hypothesis to be impossible (since both rejections are then equivalent),
enables e.g. a reduction of sample size of 21% in a study targeting a statistical power of ψ = 80% with
α = 5%.
To further illustrate such sample size reduction and that formulas (1) and (2) can also be useful when
using an exact test, we consider an example where one would attempt to show that a treatment A is
superior to a treatment B via a two-sample t-test. The parameter of interest is here θ = µA − µB , where
µA and µB represent the true means of some continuous health outcome, characterizing the effects of
treatments A and B, the reference value being θ0 = 0 and the null hypothesis H3 : µA = µB . The test
statistic is given by tstat =
√
n/2(x¯A− x¯B)/s with s2 = (s2A+s2B)/2, where x¯A and x¯B denote the sample
means and s2A and s
2
B the sample variances of the health outcome calculated from two samples of size n.
Assuming a normal distribution and a same variance σ2 for both treatments, the null distribution is a t-
distribution with 2n−2 degrees of freedom, which can be approximated by a standard normal distribution
for a large n, as in a Wald test. If the goal is to reject H5 : µA ≤ µB , expecting a “medium” treatment
effect expressed as (µA − µB)/σ = 0.5 (Cohen, 1988), using a significant level α = 5%, and targeting a
statistical power of ψ = 80%, one may calculate a sample size via (1) of (noting that SE(θ̂) =
√
2σ2/n,
such that τ2 = 2σ2):
n =
(z1−α/2 + zψ)2 · 2σ2
(µA − µB)2 =
2(1.96 + 0.84)2
0.52
= 63.
Now, if one considers that the null hypothesis H3 : µA = µB is impossible (i.e. that the two treatments
cannot have exactly the same effect), one will content to reject the hypothesis H4 : µA < µB and one will
calculate a sample size via (2) of:
n =
(z1−α + zψ)2 · 2σ2
(µA − µB)2 =
2(1.645 + 0.84)2
0.52
= 50
achieving a (63 − 50)/63 = 21% reduction of sample size. Under such assumptions, one can check via
simulation that the probability to reject H5 : µA ≤ µB (decision 5 from our testing procedure) via a two-
sample t-test with two groups of size n = 63, i.e. to get tstat > 1.979 (the quantile 97.5% of a t-distribution
with 124 degrees of freedom), is about 79.3%, whereas the probability to reject H4 : µA < µB (decision
4 or decision 5 from our testing procedure) with two groups of size n = 50, i.e. to get tstat > 1.661 (the
quantile 95% of a t-distribution with 98 degrees of freedom) is about 79.7% (estimated from 100’000
simulations), both pretty close to the targeted power of 80%.
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5 Conclusions
The formulation of hypothesis testing proposed by Kaiser (1960) and Jones and Tukey (2000) allows one
to perform on the same data two traditional one-sided tests, trying to reject two different composite hy-
potheses. Since the corresponding alternative hypotheses are also one-sided, interpretation of a significant
result is straightforward. Not having to divide by two the nominal significance level when performing
these two tests, as advocated by Jones and Tukey (2000), also implies “the abolition, once and for all, of
the controversy over whether a one-sided or two-sided test is appropriate” (Freedman, 2008, 2009). Note
that a similar procedure is used in bioequivalence studies, where two one-sided tests, run to reject two
disjoint composite hypotheses, are also typically conducted at 5%, and where the calculation of a 90%
(instead of a 95%) confidence interval has been advocated (Schuirmann, 1987; Westlake, 1981).
In this paper, we have introduced a five-decision testing procedure which can be seen as an extension
of both approaches. On the one hand, this is an extension of Kaiser’s testing procedure from a three-
to a five-decision testing procedure (our decisions 2 and 4 being absent from Kaiser’s procedure, in fact
merged with our decision 3). On the other hand, our five-decision testing procedure reduced to Jones and
Tukey’s three-decision testing procedure if the null hypothesis is considered to be impossible (decision 1
being then equivalent to decision 2, and decision 5 being equivalent to decision 4). Importantly, the five-
decision testing procedure can be used both by those who believe in the plausibility of the null hypothesis
and those who do not. For the former, our approach is still more powerful than Kaiser’s one, allowing to
distinguish between the rejection of a strict and of a non-strict inequality. For the latter, it is as powerful
as Jones and Tukey’s approach, allowing a non negligible reduction of the sample size needed to reach a
given statistical powercompared to a traditional sample size calculation, e.g. of 21%, as illustrated in our
example of Section 4, although this calculation was based on asymptotic formulae and may need large
sample sizes to become effective.
Although our approach is clearly frequentist, it is interesting to see how allowing the option of believing
or not in the plausibility of a null hypothesis reflects Bayesian thinking. While controlling the probability
to make a wrong rejection is not a Bayesian concept, one considers in a Bayesian context a prior and a
posterior distribution for a parameter θ, such that it is also possible to assign prior and calculate posterior
probabilities associated to the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 considered above. In that context,
those believing in the plausibility of the null hypothesis should assign a non zero prior probability to H3,
translating to a non-continuous prior distributionfor θ (with a point mass at the reference value θ0) in
Bayesian inference. As a consequence, the posterior probabilities for (and hence Bayesian inference about)
H1 and H5 will be different than for respectively H2 and H4. In the other case (H3 being impossible),
the posterior probabilities for (and hence Bayesian inference about) H1 and H5 are the same than for
respectively H2 and H4. Therefore, a common point in Bayesian inference and our five-decision testing
procedure is that believing or not in the plausibility of the null hypothesis H3 affects inference on H1,
H2, H4 and H5.
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